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CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN 
INDONESIAN AND MALAY WORLD 
Islam Liberal, Islam Hadhari, and Islam Progresif1 
Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad 
IAIN Ar-Raniry, Banda Aceh - Indonesia 
Abstract: Islam in Indonesian and Malay world is very 
much heterogenuous. Taking Islam Liberal, Islam Hadhari, 
and Islam Progresif as the subject of analysis, this article deals 
with the concepts Islam Liberal, Islam Hadhari, and Islam 
Progresif as products of the trends in Islamic thinking, the 
impact of these three interpretations of Islam in Malaysia 
and Indonesia, the similarities and dissimilarities between 
the three, and their future prospects in the region. It argues 
that the prominence of the debates surrounding the three 
currents of Islamic thought is the result of struggles for 
power and authority in Islamic discourse in the region. It 
further argues that the Indonesian-based Islam Liberal 
differs from the Malaysian-based Islam Hadhari in that it 
does not originate from government sources. Islam Progresif 
is more of an umbrella term referring to various strands of 
thought developed by Muslims opposed to the status quo. 
Although Islam Hadhari is a newly-coined term, it contains 
many elements in common with other schools of Islamic 
thought including Islam Liberal and neo-modernist Islam. 
Keywords: Islam Liberal, Islam Hadhari, Islam Progresif 
Islamic thought, Indonesian-Malay World.  
Introduction 
The diversity of currents in Islamic thought has enriched the 
development of Islam in Southeast Asia. Islam Liberal (“Liberal Islam”), 
Islam Hadhari (“Civilizational Islam”), and Islam Progresif (“Progressive 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Patrick Jory and Ronald Lukens-Bull for their valuable comments 
during the preparation of this article. 
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Islam”) are currents in recent development of Islamic thought in this 
region. Geographically Islam Liberal  is a concept developed by young 
intellectual activists in Indonesia linked to the Islamic organizations 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.2 Islam Hadhari is an 
officially-controlled version of Islam promoted by former Malaysian 
Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. Islam Progresif is an umbrella term 
referring to a school of Islamic thought that could at once be described 
as liberal, moderate, or puritan.3  
To be sure, there are many other versions of Islam in Southeast 
Asia, particularly Indonesia. In terms of organizations, NU and 
Muhammadiyah are the largest Muslim organizations not only in 
Indonesia but also in Southeast Asia. They also have own 
interpretations of Islam, and their members tend to be staunch 
followers. Great diversity also exists in the practices of and approaches 
to Islam in areas such as Aceh, Padang, Java, Lombok, and 
Kalimantan.4 In sum, the development of Islam in Indonesia is very 
much heterogenuous.5 
This article addresses four main questions; how the concepts Islam 
Liberal, Islam Hadhari, and Islam Progresif are products of certain trends 
in Islamic thinking, the impact of these three interpretations of Islam 
in Southeast Asia (especially in Malaysia and Indonesia), the similarities 
                                                 
2 See Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, “Islam Hadhari and Islam Liberal in 
Southeast Asia,” in Congress of Democrats from the Islamic World “Beyond Elections: Islam and 
Political Parties in Southeast Asia” (Jakarta: National Democratic Institute, 2005). 
Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, Wajah Baru Islam Di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: UII 
Press, 2004). Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, “Metamorfosis Pemikiran Intelektual 
Muda NU: Suatu Pandangan Dari Outsider NU,” Millah 4, 1 (2004). M.A. Fattah 
Santoso, “Fenomena Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) Sebuah Studi Pendahuluan,” 
Profetika: Jurnal Studi Islam 5, no. 2 (2003): pp. 155-179. 
3 See Omid Safi, “What Is Progressive Islam,” ISIM Newsletter, no. 13 (2003), pp. 48-
49; Farish A. Noor, “The Challenges and Prospects for ‘Progressive Islam’ in 
Southeast Asia: Reclaiming the Faith in the Age of George Bush and Osama Ben 
Laden,” ICIP JOURNAL 1, no. 1 (2004): pp. 1-31; Khaled Aboue El Fadl, The Great 
Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2005).  
4 See generally, Erni Budiwanti, “The Impact of Islam on the Religion of the Sasak in 
Bayan, West Lombok,” Kultur 2, no. 2 (2001): pp. 29-40; Bustamam-Ahmad, Wajah 
Baru Islam Di Indonesia. Nina Herlina Lubis, “Religious Thoughts and Practices of the 
Kaum Menak: Strengthening Traditional Power,” Studia Islamika 10, no. 2 (2003): pp. 
1-31.  
5 Nurcholish Madjid, “Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism: Indonesian Experiences,” 
Studia Islamika 1, no. 1 (1994), p. 60.  
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and dissimilarities between the three, and their future prospects in the 
region. It argues that the prominence of the debates surrounding the 
three currents is the result of struggles for power and authority in 
Islamic thought in the region.  
Mapping Islamic Thought in Southeast Asia 
Azyumardi Azra has argued that Southeast Asian Islam historically, 
sociologically, culturally and politically has often been regarded as 
marginal and peripheral vis-à-vis Middle Eastern Islam.6 But to say that 
Southeast Asia Islam is not very Islamized is misleading. Although 
Islam in Southeast Asia may not resemble  Islam in the Middle East, 
Islam in Southeast Asia is indeed already Islamized, its development is 
a result of the process of compromise between Islam and local 
cultures. Historically speaking, there has been little tension between 
Islam and local tradition, except when the Dutch scholars in Indonesia 
attempted to differentiate Islam from local tradition in order to clarify 
the source of law of the indigenous people.7 
In early development of Islamic thought in Southeast Asia, most of 
the works by `ulama>’ who served Islamic kingdoms such as Aceh, 
Melaka, and Pattani were a response to issues concerning the ummah 
on the orders of the Sultan. The works of Nurdin Ar-Raniri, S{ira>t} al-
Mustaqi>m (1634), and Abdul Rauf Singkeli, Mir’at al-T{ulla>b (1663), are 
prominent examples of Islamic voices within this generation.8 Even 
                                                 
6 Azyumardi Azra, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism,” (Paper 
presented at Miegunyah Public Lecture, The University of Melbourne, Wednesday 6 
April 2005), p. 129; Azyumardi Azra, “Southeast Asian Islam in the Post-Bali 
Bombing: Debunking the Myth”, in Norbert Eschborn et al. (eds.), Indonesia Today: 
Problems & Perspectives (Jakarta: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2004), p. 143.  
7 Harry J. Benda, “Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic 
Policy in Indonesia,” The Journal of Modern History 30, 4 (1958), pp. 338-347. See also 
Ratno Lukito, “The Role of Custom in the Formation of Islamic Law,” McGill Journal 
of Middle East Studies 5 (1997), pp. 5-31. Ratno Lukito, “Islamic Law and the Colonial 
Encounters: The Experience of India and Indonesia,” in Yudian Wahyudi, Akh. 
Minhaji, and Amirul Hadi (eds), The Dynamics of Islamic Civilization (Yogyakarta: Titian 
Ilahi Press, 1998), pp. 209-230; Ratno Lukito, Islamic Law and Adat Encounter: The 
Experience of Indonesia (Jakarta: Logos, 2001);  Ratno Lukito, Pergumulan Antara Hukum 
Islam dan Adat di Indonesia (Jakarta: INIS, 1998).  
8 See Bustamam-Ahmad, Wajah Baru Islam Di Indonesia, pp. 311-326; Ahmad Daudy, 
Syeikh Nuruddin Ar-Raniry (Sejarah, Karya dan Sanggahan terhadap Wujudiyyah di Aceh) 
(Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1978); Oman Fathurahman, Tanbi>h Al-Ma>syi> Menyoal Wahdatul 
Wujud: Kasus Abdurrauf Singkel Di Aceh Abad 17 (Bandung: Mizan, 1999); HP. Daly, 
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though these works are concerned with Islamic law, it seems that 
Islamic thought had a close relationship with both Southeast Asian 
Islamic kingdoms and H{aramayn (Makkah and Madinah).9 The key 
point, as Azra argues in his dissertation, is that this era represents the 
first period of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia.10 Azra identifies 
Nurdin Ar-Raniri as one of the most important early mujaddids 
(reformists) in the Archipelago.11 According to Peter G. Riddel, in 
fulfilling this role ar-Raniri was transmitting the reformist pulses 
originating in both Arabia and India, thereby stimulating the 
Islamization of the archipelago.12 
The second phase of Islamic thought in Southeast Asia began 
when Muslim thinkers started to be influenced by Islamic reformism in 
Middle East in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since 
converting to Islam the Malays have traditionally had a high reverence 
for the Hijaz – which holds the two holy cities, Makkah and Madinah – 
and its `ulama>’, whom they regard as a source of religious and political 
authority, when the need for an authoritative decision arises.13 In this 
                                                                                                      
Hukum Perkawinan Islam: Suatu Studi Perbandingan dalam Kalangan Ahlul-Sunnah dan 
Negara-Negara Islam (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1989).  
9 On this see also Mohammad Redzuan Othman, Islam Dan Masyarakat Melayu: Peranan 
Timur Tengah (Kuala Lumpur: UM Press, 2005), pp. 63-81.  
10 See Azyumardi Azra, “The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: 
Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian ‘Ulama’ in the Sevententh and 
Eighteenth Centuries” (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Columbia University, 1992), 
p. 351.  
11 See Azyumardi Azra, Islam Reformis Dinamika Intelektual dan Gerakan (Jakarta: Raja 
Grafindo Persada, 1999), pp. 166-8; Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism: 
Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern 'Ulama in the 17th and 18th Centuries 
(Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); Bustamam-Ahmad, Wajah Baru Islam di 
Indonesia, p. 304. About Azyumardi Azra see Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, 
“Kontribusi Azyumardi Azra dalam Studi Sejarah Sosial Islam di Asia Tenggara,” 
Profetika: Jurnal Studi Islam 5, 2 (2003): pp. 180-204; Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, 
“Studi Sejarah Sosial Islam di Asia Tenggara: Kontribusi Azyumardi Azra,” Mimbar 
Agama & Budaya XX, 3 (2003): pp. 249-70. 
12 Peter G. Riddel, “Schools of Islamic Thought in Southeast Asia,” in Islam in Southeast 
Asia and China: Regional Faithlines and Faultlines on the Global Ummah (Hong Kong: 2002). 
3. See also Peter G. Riddel, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and 
Responses (Singapore: Horizon Books, 2003), pp. 101-139. 
13 Mohammad Redzuan Othman, “In Search of and Islamic Leader: Malay Perceptions 
of Ibn Sa'u >d and the Domination of the Wahhabi>s Saudi Arabia,” Studia Islamika 11, 2 
(2004), p. 261.  
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phase the dynamics of Islamic intellectualism in Southeast Asia were 
influenced by the Middle East in a number of ways. First, pilgrimage to 
the Hijaz was seen as part of the process of learning Islam from “the 
true area of Islam” in the world. Some Malays did not return to the 
Archipelago because they wanted to continue their studies at 
H {aramayn. Second, some Malays went to H{aramayn after graduating 
from local pondok/pesantren/surau to learn more about Islam from 
specialized `ulama>’. During this period they also studied the political 
situation in the Middle East, especially in H{aramayn, Egypt and 
Turkey. Third, many `ulama>s also produced newspapers or magazines 
to dissiminate their reformist ideas in the Archipelago, such as Seruan 
Al-Azhar, Pilehan Timoer, Idaran Zaman, Pengasoh, al-Ikhwan, and al-
Imâm.14 In sum, the early twentieth century was the period when 
Islamic reformism began to spread widely across the Indonesian 
Archipelago. Based on the reformist ideas of the Cairo `ulama>’, 
Indonesian Muslims engaged in the project of purifying Muslims’ 
religious practices and voicing the need to reformulate Islamic 
doctrines in the light of the modern spirit of progress.15 
The third phase of Islamic thought in Southeast Asia began when 
Orientalists from Western countries conducted research on Islam 
motivated by both purely academic and colonial interests. They have 
played an important role in Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia. 
Historically, the coming of the Orientalists to Southeast Asia can be 
divided into three periods. Initially they came as travelers, writing 
reports on the situation of the Islamic communities in the region.16 
                                                 
14 On this, see generally Othman, Islam Dan Masyarakat Melayu: Peranan Timur Tengah, 
pp. 109-67; William Roff, “Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920's,” 
Indonesia 9 (1970), pp. 73-87. 
15 Jajat Burhanuddin, “The Fragmentation of Religious Authority: Islamic Print Media 
in Early 20th Century Indonesia,” Studia Islamika 11, no. 1 (2004), p. 27. See also 
Charles Kurzman, “Introduction: The Modernist Islamic Movement,” in Charles 
Kurzman (ed.), Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), pp. 3-27; Riddel, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and 
Responses, pp. 207-15; William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Have: Yale 
University Press., 1967), pp. 56-67; William Roff, “Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua: 
Innovation and Reaction Amongst the Malays, 1900-41,” in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon 
Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (eds), Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 1986), pp. 123-9. 
16 See Anthony Reid, “Completing the Circle: Southeast Asian Studies in Southeast 
Asia,” in ARI Working Paper (Singapore: ARI, 2003), pp. 1-3.  
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Many of their reports have become important sources for our 
knowledge about the situation of Muslims in Southeast Asia at this 
time. Second, they arrived in Southeast Asia as part of colonial 
missions. In this phase, the Dutch scholar C.S Snouck Hurgronje 
played a critical role in Islamic studies during his sojourns in Indonesia 
and Makkah in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.17 The 
other scholar who has had a key influence was an American 
anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. Based on his research at Modjukuto, 
Central Java, in the 1950s, Geertz developed a typology in which 
Muslim society in Indonesia was seen as divided into three groups, 
santri, abangan, and priyayi.18 Geertz’s scheme of classification exerted 
great influence on scholars, both Indonesian and non-Indonesian, who 
attempted to describe Muslim society based on their socio-politico 
outlook.19 Benedict Anderson remarks that political scientists largely 
adopted Geertz’s framework but often utilized it in a subtly selective 
way. By treating the three aliran (lit. “streams”) as parallel vertical 
pyramids they frequently overlooked or underestimated the power 
relation between them.20 The third phase of the Orientalist influence 
on Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia has been the development of the 
field of Asian or Southeast Asia Studies in Western universities, which 
included the study of Muslims in the region.  
The latest phase in Islamic Studies has arisen when Southeast 
Asian scholars began to produce their own interpretations of Islam, 
starting from early years after independence until the present. This 
group was certainly influenced by the thinking of Western countries, in 
particular the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
                                                 
17 See Benda, “Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic 
Policy in Indonesia,” pp. 338-47. 
18 See Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1960); Clifford Geertz, “The Religion of Java,” in Ibrahim, Readings on 
Islam, pp. 271-8; Bahtiar Effendy, “What Is Political Islam? An Examination of Its 
Theoretical Mapping in Modern Indonesia,“ in Chaider S. Bamualim (ed.), A Portrait of 
Contemporary Indonesian Islam, (Jakarta: CLS and KAS, 2005), pp. 9-15. 
19 See M. Bambang Pranowo, “From Aliran to Liberal Islam: Remapping Indonesian 
Islam,” in Bamualim (ed.), A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam, pp. 27-34; Fred 
Inglis, Clifford Geertz: Culture, Customs and Ethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).  
20 Benedict O’Gorman Anderson, “Perspective and Method in American Research on 
Indonesia,” in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds), Interpreting Indonesian Politics: 
Thirteen Contribution to the Debate (New York: Cornell University, 1982), p. 78. 
  
Contemporary Islamic thought 
97 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 05, Number 01, June 2011 
Australia, which offered scholarships to Southeast Asian scholars to 
study Islamic Studies or Muslim societies in these countries. In this 
context John L. Esposito and John O. Voll argue that, 
As a part of the interaction with the West and the 
consequent Westernization and modernization of 
significant sectors in Muslim societies, a grouping (or 
“class”) of “secular intellectuals” emerged. These people 
were similar to, and possibly both inspired and created by, 
their counterparts in the evolving modern societies of 
Western Europe and North America.21 
In Islamic Studies discourse this group could be described as 
“modernist”, “neo-modernist”, “secularist”, “liberal”, and “post-
traditionalist”. In fact, this terminology does not derive from 
“indigenous” discourse in Islamic studies (dira>sah Isla>mi>yah) but rather 
from the social sciences developed by Western scholars. Modernist 
scholars tend to go back to the Qur’a>n and Sunnah and develop 
interpretations that are adapted to the modern era. In this group Riddel 
lists scholars such as Harun Nasution, S.M.N Al-Attas, Nurcholish 
Madjid, Anwar Ibrahim, Hasbullah Bakry, Djarnawi Hadikusuma, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, and Chandra Muzaffar.22 
Furthermore, he has categorized Nasution and Madjid as neo-
modernists, and Rais as a modernist.23 Charles Kurzman lists a number 
of other figures whom he regards as modernists, including Achmad 
Dahlan, Syeikh Ahmad Surkati, Agus Salim, Ahmad Hassan, and 
Hasyim Asy’ari.24 For Kurzman, the modernist movement was “the 
self-conscious adoption of “modern” values […] associated with the 
modern world, especially rationality, science, constitutionalism, and 
certain forms of human equality. Thus this movement was not simply 
“modern” (a feature of modernity) but also “modernist” (a proponent 
of modernity).”25 
                                                 
21 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 12. For the origin of this group see also Howard M. 
Federspiel, “Muslim Intellectual in Southeast Asia,” Studia Islamika 6, 1 (1999), pp. 41-
76.  
22 Riddel, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses, pp. 231-58. 
23 Riddel, “Schools of Islamic Thought in Southeast Asia,” pp. 12-15.  
24 Charles Kurzman, “Introduction: The Modernist Islamic Movement.”  
25 Ibid., p. 4.  
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The term “neo-modernist”, first proposed by Fazlur Rahman of 
Chicago University, has been promoted in the study of Southeast 
Asian Islam by Greg Barton of Deakin University in his Ph.D. 
dissertation on Islam in Indonesia.26 He characterizes the outlook of 
scholars in this movement as combining classical Islamic scholarship 
with modern, or Western, analytical methods. They have enjoyed the 
benefit of both a classical or traditional Islamic education revolving 
around the study of the Qur’a>n and classical Arabic texts, and a 
modern Western-style education.27 According to Barton, this kind of 
Islamic thought is represented by figures such as Madjid, Djohan 
Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, and Wahid.28 For Riddel Islamic neo-
modernists: 
… tend not to see Islam through the lens of shari’ah law, 
but rather in terms of universal values. These values need 
to be agreed by non-Muslim as well as Muslims, in the view 
of the neo-modernist. […] Neo-modernists are more 
inclined towards a Western-style democracy than other 
Muslim groups, and their public discourse gives greater 
emphasis to human rights and women’s rights […] the neo-
modernists consider that the Qur’a >n and Sunnah should be 
open to new and evolving interpretations [...] the neo-
modernists are more concerned with the essence of Islamic 
teaching than its form. […] Neo-modernists are more 
positively disposed to Western liberal thought; they 
prioritise social and economic interests over political power 
and they cooperate with secular groups.29 
The issue of secularism in Islamic thought, that is, the attempt to 
separate Islam and politics, is a vexed one. Mohammed Arkoun has 
                                                 
26 See generally Greg Barton, “Neo-Modernisme: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist 
and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia,” Studia Islamika 2, 3 (1995), pp. 1-75; 
Greg Barton, “Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual 
Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernist in Neo-Modernist 
Thought,” Islam and Christian-Muslim 8, 3 (1997), pp. 337-42; Greg Barton, Gagasan 
Islam Liberal di Indonesia: Pemikiran Neo-Modernisme Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, 
Ahmad Wahib, Dan Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999).  
27 Barton, “Neo-Modernisme: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist 
Islamic Thought in Indonesia,” P. 7.  
28 See also Malcom Cone, “Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto’s Indonesia,” New Zealand 
Journal of Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (2002), pp. 52-67.  
29 Riddel, “Schools of Islamic Thought in Southeast Asia,” p. 12.  
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attempted to theorize the problem of secular thought in Islam. He 
specifically argues that (1) Secularism is included in the Qur’a>n and the 
Medinan experience; (2) The Umayyad and Abbasid states can also be 
regarded as secularist; (3) Military power played a very early and 
prominent role in the Caliphate, the Sultanate, and all later so-called 
“Islamic” forms of government; (4) Attempts to rationalize de facto 
secularism and to develop a secular attitude were made by the falsifah 
[Muslim philosophers]; (5) So-called “orthodox” expressions of Islam 
are in fact arbitrary selections and ideological uses of beliefs and ideas 
and practices perceived as authentically religious; (6) The whole status 
of the religious, of the sacred, and of revelation, has to be reexamined 
in light of a modern theory of knowledge; (7) All political regimes 
which have appeared in Islamic societies following their liberation 
from colonialism are de facto “secular”, dominated by Western 
models, cut off from the classical theory of authority as well as from 
intellectual modernity; (8) …. laicité as a source and space of intellectual 
freedom to initiate a new theory and practice of authority, is a work 
also to be undertaken in Western societies today.30  
In Islamic Studies, those who challenge the accepted role of Islam 
in society may be called “secularists”. This group tends to be regarded 
as always opposed to the fundamentalists (or “radicals”, “Islamists”, 
“Salafists”, and “terrorists”). In fact, those outside hard-line Islamic 
movements, including modernists, neo-modernists, liberals, and post-
traditionalists are often considered “secularists” in the minds of the 
fundamentalists.31 
Islamic thought in Southeast Asia can thus be divided into 
different phases, with each phase preoccupied by different concerns. 
In the first phase most thinkers tried to solve the problems of Muslims 
in daily life and save them from what they regarded as the dangers of 
Sufism. Although this current of thought was seen as reformism at the 
time, its concerns were quite different to the problems that concerned 
the reformists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – for instance 
colonialism, the backwardness of Muslims in education, and the 
                                                 
30 See Mohammed Arkoun, “The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought: La 
Hukma Illa Lilla>h,” in C.E. Boswirth, et al (eds), The Islamic World: From Classical to 
Modern Times (Darwin: The Darwin Press, 1989), pp. 50-1. 
31 Generally, see Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Ada Pemurtadan Di IAIN (Jakarta: Al-Kautsar, 
2005).  
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problem of modernization. The reformism of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries was a movement developed by `ulama>’ and 
influenced by Middle Eastern scholars. Modernization in Islamic 
thought in the late-nineteenth century was quite different again from 
the modernization of the twentieth century. This latter period saw the 
rise of Muslim intellectuals and the decline of the traditional `ulama>’ in 
Southeast Asia. This new group enjoys good relations with Muslim 
intellectuals around the world as well as with Western scholars. Finally, 
Islamic thought in the twentieth century has been dominated by social 
and political concerns.32  
Islam Liberal; 
From a Textual to a Contextual approach in Islamic Studies 
The term Islam Liberal is not traditionally found in Islamic 
scholarship. Historically, however, liberal thinking in Islam can be said 
to have first surfaced in religious discourse in philosophy and 
subsequently in Sufism.33 Most thinkers in Islam who may be 
categorized as “liberal” were philosophers, such as Ibn Rusyd (1126-
1197),34 the author of Bidayat al-Mujtahid, a book discusses on the 
comparative perspective of Islamic jurist on Islamic law. The 
relationship between reason and revelation has represented a very 
serious issue in Islamic philosophy and theology. The school of 
Mu’tazilah appears liberal and rational compared to other Islamic 
theological schools. The Mu’tazilah school took the stance that human 
reason is able to recognize God.35 
Liberal thought gained ground among Muslim thinkers in the 
twentieth century.36 In his books Liberal Islam (1998) and Modernist 
                                                 
32 Richard C. Martin, Islamic Studies: A History of Religious Approach (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall: Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 239.  
33 Komaruddin Hidayat, “Contemporary Liberal Islam in Indonesia, Pluralism, and the 
Secular State,” in Bamualim (ed.), A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam, p. 54.  
34 On Ibn Rusyd see Ernest Wolf-Gazo, “Contextualizing Averroes within the 
German Hermeneutic Tradition,” Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics 16 (1996), p. 133-
163. 
35 Saiful Muzani, “Mu'tazilah Theology and the Modernization of the Indonesian 
Muslim Community: Intellectual Portrait of Harun Nasution,” Studia Islamika 1, 1 
(1994), p. 113.  
36 Charles Kurzman, “Liberal Islam: Prospects and Challenges,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 2, no. 2 (1999), p. 11-9. 
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Islam (2002) Charles Kurzman tries to trace the roots of liberal Islam. 
According to Kurzman, every region of the Islamic world has 
witnessed parallel debates over the past two centuries between three 
traditions of socio-religious interpretation. The first tradition may be 
called customary Islam, characterized by the combination of regional 
practices and those that are shared throughout the Islamic world. The 
second tradition is revivalist Islam, also known variously as Islamism, 
fundamentalism, or Wahhabism. The third is liberal Islam, which 
defines itself in contrast to customary traditions and calls upon the 
precedent of the early period of Islam in order to de-legitimize 
present-day practices.37 
The secularization of Muslim society is among key issues for 
scholars of liberal Islam. In Indonesia, the fierce debate about the 
merits of separating Islam and State came to a head following the 
declaration of independence of August 17 1945, in which the 
secularists were represented by Soekarno and the Islamists by 
Mohammad Natsir.38 At that time the secularists were able to win the 
elections and the debates in parliament. It is not difficult to understand 
why the controversy about secularization, especially whether Islam 
should be the sole basis of Indonesia, should continue until today.39 At 
independence the Islamic faction in Indonesian politics was divided 
into two groups. The first group agreed to join the government while 
continuing to argue the case for Islam to be instituted as the basis of 
the state of Indonesia. The second group rejected the government and 
proceeded to carry out a rebellion in West Java, Sulawesi, and Aceh, 
known as DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia or “Islamic 
State/Indonesia Islamic Force”). The aim of this group was the 
implementation of an Islamic state and Islamic law in Indonesia. By 
                                                 
37 Charles Kurzman, “Introduction: Liberal Islam and Its Islamic Context,” in 
Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam, pp. 5-6.  
38 Saifuddin Anshari, “Islam or the Panca Sila as the Basis of the State,” in Ahmad 
Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (eds.), Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), pp. 221-228; Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 33-44; Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, Wajah Baru 
Islam di Indonesia, pp. 251-276.  
39 See Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Save Indonesian by and from Shari>‘a: A Debate on the 
implementation of Shari>‘a,” Al-Jâmi‘ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2004): 
pp. 319-341; Jamhari, “Fundamentalism and the Implementation of Shari>‘a,” in 
Bamualim (ed.), A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam, pp. 67-76.  
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the early 1960s, however, the DI movement had effectively ended after 
all of its leaders had either been arrested or killed.40  
Following the return of Nasution and Madjid from their studies at 
Western universities, liberal Islam began to receive serious attention 
among Islamic scholars in Southeast Asia. Nasution was one of the 
most influential scholars in promoting liberal thinking in Indonesia in 
1970s. After graduating from McGill University with a dissertation on 
Muhammad ‘Abduh’s theological thought, he taught at IAIN (State 
Institute of Islamic Studies). He argued that Indonesian Muslims were 
less developed in economic and cultural terms because they were 
generally theologically fatalistic and static. The theology of Ahl al-
Sunnah or Ash‘ariyyah, for him, seemed to be the primary source 
responsible for this state of stagnation and underdevelopment.41 In the 
area of Islamic law Indonesians adhere to the Syafi‘î school; in 
theology they affiliate themselves with Asy’ari, and in terms of moral 
conduct they follow Imâm al-Ghazzali. Nasution regarded this model 
of religious interpretation as narrow-minded, therefore an openness to 
Islamic reformism or modernism was a prerequisite for the 
development of the ummah. Nasution desired to replace the fatalistic or 
traditional world view (theology) of the ummah with one that is more 
dynamic, rational, and modern.42 To solve this problem, Nasution 
began to change the paradigm of teaching Islamic studies at IAIN. He 
proposed subjects that had never before been considered at IAIN, 
including Introduction to Islamic Studies, Philosophy, Islamic 
Mysticism or Sufism (Tasawwuf), Islamic Theology (Kala>m), Sociology, 
and Research Methodology.43 
Madjid was the other scholar who played a critical role in 
promoting liberal thought in Indonesia. He became an icon of Islamic 
thought Indonesia when he introduced the phrase: “Islam Yes, Partai 
Islam No!” (Islam Yes, Islamic Parties No!). Using such rhetoric, he 
encouraged his fellow Muslims to direct their commitment to Islamic 
values rather than institutions, even those with an Islamic basis such as 
                                                 
40 Jamhari, “Fundamentalism and the Implementation of Shari>‘a,” p. 8.  
41 Muzani, “Mu'tazilah Theology,” pp. 101-2. 
42 Muzani, “Mu‘tazilah Theology,” p. 102; Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in 
Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 75-76.  
43 Muzani, “Mu‘tazilah Theology,” p. 103.  
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Islamic parties.44 About his controversial address on January 2, 1970, 
when he made his controversial appeal, Madjid wrote, 
… I made this presentation because I expected a special, 
closed meeting with free discussion among the leaders of 
four young Muslim organizations. There was a strong 
reaction against my use of such controversial terms as 
“secularization,” “desacralization,” “liberalization,” 
“socialism”… I was quite aware of the danger of publicity 
referring to these points. ... Some of my adversaries 
suggested that I “repent” and apologize to the Muslim 
community. This I could hardly have done. Despite my 
knowledge that the approach was wrong, I firmly believed 
that the purpose was right.45 
Besides Nasution and Madjid, there are a number of other high-
profile Muslim thinkers in Indonesia who can be categorized as liberal, 
including former President and former head of NU Wahid, as well as 
Wahib, and Munawir Sjadzali. Wahid, for example, advocated that the 
notions of Islam were a complementary factor in Indonesia’s socio-
cultural and political life and the indigenization of Islam (pribumisasi 
Islam).46 Wahib is a controversial Muslim thinker who has promoted 
ideas about the freedom of thought, modernity and renewal, and 
contextual ijtiha>d.47 Munawir Sjadzali, an ex-Minister of Religious 
Affairs during the Soeharto regime, promoted the issue of the re-
actualization of Islamic teaching in Indonesia, especially in Islamic 
Inheritance Law in Indonesia. He has advocated the total equalization 
of inheritance rights of male and female children.48 
                                                 
44 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, p. 75.  
45 Nurcholish Madjid, “The Issue of Modernization among Muslims in Indonesia: 
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Hussain (eds.), Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), p. 384. See 
also Barton, “Neo-Modernisme: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist 
Islamic Thought in Indonesia,” p. 19. 
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47 Barton, “Neo-Modernisme: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist 
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48 See generally Munawir Sjadzali, Ijtihad Kemanusiaan (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997); 
Muhammad Wahyuni Nafis et al, Kontektualisasi Ajaran Islam: 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H. 
Munawir Sjadzali (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995). 
  
Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 05, Number 01, June 2011 
104 
Mention should also be made of the Islam Liberal network in 
Indonesia founded by young Muslims in Jakarta. Historically speaking, 
this group originated out of informal meetings of young Muslim 
activists responding to contemporary issues in Indonesia, especially the 
growth of radical Islamic movements. These activists include Luthfi 
Assyaukanie (lecturer at Paramadina University who completed his 
Ph.D in Islamic Studies at the University of Melbourne), Ulil Abshar-
Abdalla (a columnist with an NU background who received a Fulbright 
Scholarship to pursue graduate studies at Boston and later began a 
PhD at Harvard University), Ahmad Sahal (a columnist with a NU 
background), Farid Gaban (ex-journalist), Hamid Basyaib (a researcher 
at Aksara Foundation), and Deny J. A. (a lecturer at Jayabaya 
University). In March 2002 they established the Liberal Islam Network 
(Jaringan Islam Liberal) to disseminate their views through the media. An 
active website has been established (www.islamlib.com). In a 
moderated internet chat group called islamliberal@yahoogroups.com 
they debate issues, respond to questions and views, cite the Qur’a>n to 
support their arguments and provoke debates with their critics.49 
The young liberal Islamic groups trace their intellectual origins to 
many sources. Previously this kind of Islamic thought has been 
promoted by the older generation of intellectuals, such as Nasution, 
Madjid, Effendi, Wahib, Wahid, Dawam Rahardjo, and Masdar F. 
Mas’udi. These thinkers separated Islam from the political and social 
situation in Indonesia during the New Order era. The main issues at 
that time were pluralism, culturalism, inclusivism, modernism, and 
pribumisasi among Muslims in Indonesia.50 They tended to see Islam 
not through the lens of shari>‘ah law but rather in terms of universal 
values.51   
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I have argued elsewhere52 that at least seven factors are responsible 
for the liberal outlook of the young generation of Indonesia Muslims. 
First, the pesantren is their intellectual foundation. They are familiar 
with the classical texts (kitab kuning) and Islamic methodology (us}u>l al-
fiqh). This education has helped them to develop into critical scholars 
following their graduation from the pesantren, especially those with a 
NU background. Many prominent Muslim thinkers in Indonesia, 
including Madjid and Wahid, graduated from pesantren. Second, many 
young Islamic scholars have been involved in NGO activities, 
especially in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Among the members of Islam 
Liberal and its allies there are numerous NGO workers who are 
supported by international funding, for example, the Asia Foundation 
and the Ford Foundation. Third, there is an intellectual network of 
students who have graduated from Egypt. Many of the younger 
generation of Indonesian Muslims have learned about contemporary 
developments in Islam from Egypt.53  
Fourth, they tend to become liberal because of the Islamic 
education model in IAIN. Ironically, one of the main reasons why they 
become liberal when studying at IAIN is that “they do not learn in 
depth about Islamic studies.”54 Ken Miichi writes that this youngest 
generation of NU cadres with an IAIN education inherited the ideas of 
the leftist intellectual network and formed an Islamic left, working with 
non-religious and leftist social movements. They have read everything 
from Marx to Gramsci to Foucault, while in their discussions of Islam 
they often refer to Western-educated Muslim intellectuals such as 
Hasan Hanafi and Mohammed Arkoun.55 Fifth, they have been 
influenced by liberal Muslim thinkers from the Middle East with a 
Western education such as Fazlur Rahman, Abdullahi Ahmad An-
Naim, Mohammad Arkoun, Nasir Hamid Abu Zayd, Abdul Karim 
Souroush, Ali Harb, Amina Wadud, Fatima Mernissi, and Muhammad 
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Syahrur. They have translated these Islamic scholars’ works into Bahasa 
Indonesia and have sometimes invited them to give informal lectures at 
their base camp. Sixth, Indonesianists have played a significant role in 
educating their members through both formal and informal lessons. 
Some young Islam Liberal scholars have a close relationship with 
prominent Indonesianists such as Daniel S. Lev and William B. Liddle. 
Of course, most, if not all, Indonesianists are supporters of Islam 
Liberal in Indonesia.56 Seventh, one cannot underestimate the factor of 
Wahid as the leading Muslim thinker in Indonesia up until his recent 
death. It is undeniable that Abdurrahman played important role in 
Islamic discourse and became an umbrella for the Islamic younger 
generation, especially those with an NU affiliation.  
According to its website, Islam Liberal offers a new interpretation 
of Islam as a religion based on a number of insights.57 The first is the 
openness of the gates of ijtihad in every aspect. The second is its 
emphasis on the ethical-religious spirit, not the literal meaning of the 
text. The third is the acceptance of a relative, open, and plural truth. 
The fourth is its stand alongside minorities and the oppressed. The 
fifth is its affirmation of freedom of belief and faith. The sixth is the 
separation of ukhrawi (heavenly) and duniawi (worldly) authority, and 
religious and political authority.  
Again, these specific issues do not constitute “a new 
interpretation” among Muslim scholars in Indonesia. A number of 
Muslim thinkers in Indonesia have previously discussed the issue of re-
opening the gates of ijtiha>d, such as Hazairin with his “National 
Mazhab”, Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy with “Fiqh Indonesia”, Munawir 
Sjadzali with his “re-actualisation of Islamic law”, and Sahal Mahfud 
with his “Social Fiqh”. Furthermore, the term “ethical-religious spirit” 
had been promoted by Mukti Ali in religious studies among Islamic 
scholars in Indonesia through his course on Comparative Religion at 
IAIN, inspired by the work of Jaachim Wach.58 By the 1990s this issue 
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had also been endorsed by the Rector of UIN (State Islamic 
University) of Sunan Kalijaga, M. Amin Abdullah, a member of 
Muhammadiyah, in some of his works.59 His work is not as widely 
known since his publications do not appear in the national daily 
newspapers such as Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Republika. The subject 
of pluralism was also promoted by Madjid60 and Wahid61 during the 
Soeharto and Reformasi periods. Likewise the issue of secularization in 
Indonesia has been the subject of debate among Muslims since before 
Independence, in particular in the fierce debates between Soekarno 
and Mohammad Natsir.62   
According to the JIL website the reason why the group has 
adopted the name Islam Liberal is because, 
The name “Liberal Islam” illustrates our fundamental 
principles; Islam which emphasizes “private liberties” 
(according to Mu’tazilah’s doctrine regarding “human 
liberties”), and “liberation” of the socio-political structure 
from unhealthy and oppressing domination. The “liberal” 
adjective has two meanings: “liberty” (being liberal) and 
“liberating”. Please note that we do not believe in Islam as 
such – Islam without any adjective, as some people argued. 
Islam is impossible without an adjective; in fact Islam has 
been interpreted in so many different ways in accordance 
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to the interpreter's needs. We have chosen a genre of 
interpretation, and by this way, we selected an adjective for 
Islam, it is “liberal”.63 
The Islam Liberal group appears to have adopted the methodology 
of the Mu’tazilah in their mission to make ‘aql (intellect) dominant over 
wahy (revelation). That is, their arguments are based on logic rather 
than Islamic revelation.  
It could be argued that this latest manifestation of Islam Liberal in 
Indonesia is in fact a response to the recent rise of radical Islamic 
movements and their demands to establish an Islamic state in 
Indonesia and to enforce Islamic law, increased anti-Americanism, and 
other controversial issues in Islamic discourse such as the position of 
the Qur’a>n and the H{adi>th, marriage between Muslims and non-
Muslims, gender issues and secularization. Ulil admits to being 
frequently accused of being an ally of the Americans, a CIA agent, and 
of having unlimited access to American money.64 In fact, many Islam 
Liberal projects are indeed funded by international agencies and, and 
they have been entrapped in the “be careful” academic environment 
post 9/11.65 Since the emergence of Jaringan Islam Liberal an on-going 
debate has developed between supporters of Islam Liberal including JIL 
and some young Islamic scholars from Muhammadiyah and NU – and 
“Islam Literal” (Literal Islâm) organizations such as Lasykar Jihad, Front 
Pembela Islam, Partai Keadilan, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesian, 
and Majelis Mujahidin. Barry Desker points out that the debate 
between Muslim fundamentalists and the liberals in Indonesia mirrors 
similar debates between Christian fundamentalists and liberals in the 
West.66 For instance, Media Dakwah of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah 
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Indonesian publications, accuses JIL of promoting an evil logic, of 
being a form of terrorism, of being dangerous for Islam, of destroying 
Islamic theology, of being Orientalists and secularists, as well as being 
anti-dialogue. Fundamentalist groups debate the Islam Liberal activists 
in open public forums. Sometimes the debate is not about the main 
topic but rather a “battle of ayats,” “the yellow books”, and “the voices 
of `ulama>’ from the fundamentalist front.” In one debate held in 
Yogyakarta, many of the participants accused Ulil and his friends of no 
longer being Muslims, but ka>fir (infidels). Ironically, these statements 
came from scholars studying at secular universities, rather than from 
the Islam-based IAINs or the pesantren students.67 Fundamentalist 
groups in Indonesia often appear to be based at and find their 
inspiration from the secular universities. 
Islam Hadhari; 
The Politics of “Islamic Civilization” in Malaysia 
Since independence, politics in Malaysia has been dominated by 
the Malays.68 When we speak of the Malays, it is difficult to avoid 
discussing the place of Islam in Malaysia, both politically and 
sociologically. The politicization of Islam has become a key factor in 
the Malaysian political terrain in recent years. It has found perhaps 
clearest expression in the so-called “Islamization race” between the 
ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and 
the opposition Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).69 Political Islam has 
manifested great intra-communal tensions within the Malay 
community. As the two Malay political parties battle for political 
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legitimacy and electoral support, the resulting competition has led to 
efforts to institutionalize Islam and expand the religious bureaucracy, 
thereby sharpening the debate over what Islam means in Malaysia and 
how it should be practiced.70 
There are two problems in attempting to situate the place of Islam 
in Malaysia. The first is the question of the relationship between Islam 
and the state, which, because it has never been satisfactorily resolved 
by Muslim thinkers, continues to play a vital role in the ongoing 
debate. The second is the shift in the meaning of Islamic debates that 
tend to adopt a perspective that is too focused on Islam as a unifying 
political and social force.71  
The most representative Islamic figures in Malaysia are from the 
Malay parties, UMNO and PAS. The political struggle between these 
two parties has had serious consequences for the implementation of 
Islamic teachings in Malaysia. PAS provides an interesting example 
with its attempt at constructing and enforcing a system of “Islamic 
democracy” in the two east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu.72 
Driven by the global resurgence of Islamic consciousness and 
strengthened by the enthusiasm of the new guard, epitomized by 
figures such as Fadzil Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang, and Nakhaie Ahmad, 
a rejuvenated PAS began pushing a more deliberate Islamic agenda in 
Malaysia as a political tactic to whittle away support for UMNO.73 In 
UMNO there has also been much debate about the role of Islam in 
modern Malaysia. Basically, the roots of the controversy involve the 
question of how to bring Malaysia into the modern era with an Islamic 
coloring. But the real debate has been over the interpretation of the 
shari>‘ah, especially after Anwar Ibrahim joined the party in 1982. Since 
his days as leader of ABIM Anwar rationalized the theme of struggle 
for socio-economic justice with the ideals of Islam, and used this 
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philosophy to organize students behind him in a campaign against pro-
Western leaders. 
The step of bringing Anwar into UMNO has been interpreted as 
an attempt by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to weaken 
the Islamic opposition while at the same time strengthening the 
government’s Islamic credentials.74 This situation has had serious 
implications for UMNO in their election strategy because virtually all 
Malays are Muslim and most Muslims in Malaysia are Malay. The 
problem of identity has become a source of debate within UMNO 
itself. Under Mahathir Islam was brought to the forefront of UMNO 
and Malaysian politics, and many of Mahathir’s ideas were adopted by 
UMNO and the government. He used Islam as a wedge to attack the 
opposition party PAS, accusing them of not being interested in 
Malaysia’s development. UMNO resorted to controlling the 
mainstream media to generate public apprehension regarding the 
Islamic opposition. In an attempt to define the boundaries of Islamic 
politics in Malaysia the UMNO-led government regularly portrays PAS 
members as “fanatics” and “radicals” while portraying itself as the 
representative of “modern” and “progressive” Islam. Provocative 
remarks purportedly made by PAS leaders over the years and amplified 
by the government-controlled media have been used to promoted 
negative perceptions of PAS as “fundamentalists”.75 
Mahathir’s vision of Islam as a force for modernization and 
industrialization won acceptance from most non-Muslim Malaysians. 
Muslim Malaysians, however, tended to be uncomfortable with such 
ideas76 since they seemed to imply giving special rights to “non-
Malays’, especially in the economy. Malays increasingly pressured the 
government to confer special rights on Muslims in the form of 
bringing back Malay culture with an Islamic coloring.77 
Following the general election in 1999 the tensions increased when 
PAS extended its political control beyond the northeastern state of 
                                                 
74 Jan Stark, “The Islamic Debate in Malaysia,” p. 179.   
75 Liow, “Deconstructing Political Islam in Malaysia: Umno’s Response to Pas’ Religio-
Political Dialectic,” p. 8.  
76 Interview with Datuk Wan Wahid, a government official in Pahang, Kuantan, July 
2004. 
77 This idea was discussed at a Malay Conference at Putri Pan Pacific Hotel, Johor, 
October 11-12 2004. 
  
Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 05, Number 01, June 2011 
112 
Kelantan to Trengganu and become the main voice of the 
opposition.78 The issues of Islamic statehood, the implementation of 
shari>‘ah, and the role of women were the subject of acrimonious 
debate between the two parties. In early July 2001 in his address to the 
Convention of the Barisan Nasional coalition in Kuala Lumpur 
Mahathir controversially declared Malaysia to be an “Islamic State”. He 
made a similar statement in his address at the Gerakan party Annual 
Delegates Conference in Kuala Lumpur on 29 September 2001.79 The 
following year he went even further by claiming that Malaysia was an 
“Islamic fundamentalist state” and could be proud of the fact. The 
Malaysian government’s policies, he said, were consistent with the 
fundamental teachings of Islam.80 He acknowledged that his views 
would shock many in the West “because they consider a 
fundamentalist to be someone who is violent and did all kinds of bad 
things”. He said this perception was wrong and that it was not 
necessarily a bad thing to be a fundamentalist. 
It was in the final years of Mahathir’s prime ministership that the 
concept of Islam Hadhari began to be discussed in Malaysian 
government circles in the search for an electorally appealing concept of 
Islam that was distinct from PAS’s demands. In 2002 a committee of 
`ulama>’ and intellectuals held a discussion of the concept Islam Hadhari 
with the objective of finding a way to implement an “Islamic state” 
that was in line with “Malaysian civilization”. JAKIM (the Department 
of Islamic Development of Malaysia) also started to explore the 
direction of Islam Hadhari. At that time JAKIM was only concerned 
with the aspirations of Muslim civil servants in Malaysia.81 In 2004 new 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi announced the concept of 
Islam Hadhari in his speech at the 55th UMNO general assembly.82 He 
                                                 
78 See also William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less (Richmond: Curzon 
Press, 2003), pp. 137-43. 
79 According to Zainah Anwar, this statement was unconstitutional because it was not 
declared formally as a new law; interview with Zainah Anwar, June 2004. 
80 “Mahathir: Malaysia is ‘fundamentalist state’” http://archives.cnn.com/-
2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/06/18/malaysia.mahathir, accessed 15 October 
2004.  
81 Muhammad Syukri Salleh, “Islam Hadhari Dari Perspektif Pembangunan 
Berteraskan Islam,” Pemikir 39 & 40 (2005), p. 55.  
82 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “Moving Forward Toward Excellence,” English version 
of address to the 55th UMNO General Assembly (2004) Kuala Lumpur, pp. 1-26; 
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spoke about Islam Hadhari and the need for a globally competitive 
Malay community. He stated that “Islam Hadhari was a complete and 
comprehensive philosophy, with an emphasis on the development of 
the economy and civilization, and the building of Malay 
competitiveness”. He also argued that Islam Hadhari was an approach 
that emphasized development that was consistent with the tenets of 
Islam and was focused on enhancing the quality of life.  
Islam Hadhari was an effort to bring the ummah back to basics, to 
return to the fundamentals of Islamic civilization as prescribed in the 
Qur’a>n and the H{adi>th. In fact, this interpretation of Islam was similar 
to the neo-modernism promoted by Fazlur Rahman, a leading Islamic 
scholar from Chicago University, who has had considerable impact in 
Southeast Asia since the 1980s through his works and his students.83 
Islam Hadhari can therefore be seen as a new name for neo-modernism 
in Islamic thought. This interpretation tries to open the gate of ijtiha >d 
for Muslims in the contemporary era by combining classical Islamic 
scholarships and Islamic civilization with modern or Western ideas and 
analytical methods.84 
Badawi’s formulation of Islam Hadhari posited ten fundamental 
principles which Muslim countries were obliged to accept and follow: 
First, faith and piety in Allah; second, a just and trustworthy 
government; third, a free and independent people; fourth, vigorous 
pursuit and mastery of knowledge; fifth, balanced and comprehensive 
economic development; sixth, a good quality of life for the people; 
seventh, protection of the rights of minority groups and women; 
eighth, cultural and moral integrity; ninth, safeguarding natural 
resources and the environment; tenth, strong defense capabilities.85 
                                                                                                      
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “Lonjakan Perkasa Bangsa,” Address to the 56th UMNO 
General Assembly, Kuala Lumpur 21 July 2005, pp. 1-20. See also Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi, “Islam Hadhari Akan Bangkit,” Pemikir 39-40 (2005), pp. 1-20; Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress (Selangor: 
MPH, 2006). 
83 See generally Cone, “Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto’s Indonesia,” pp. 52-67; and 
Barton, “Neo-Modernisme: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic 
Thought in Indonesia,” pp. 1-75. 
84 Barton, “Neo-Modernisme: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist 
Islamic Thought in Indonesia,” p. 7. 
85 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “Islam Hadhari,” Keynote Address at Jamia Millia Islamia, 
Delhi, India, 21 December 2004, available at Official Website of the Prime Minister’s 
Office of Malaysia, www.pmo.gov.my; Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “The Oxford Centre 
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Badawi argued that the gates of ijtiha>d must remain open so that 
interpretations are suited to the prevailing needs and conditions of the 
times.86 In his 2004 speech at the Jami Millia Islamia forum, Badawi 
suggested that the problems confronting contemporary Muslim 
societies today were not the problems of the sixteenth century and the 
solutions they need today did not lie with the notion of a shari >‘ah 
purportedly final and complete fourteen hundred years ago.87 Badawi 
thus demonstrated his support for the position of ijtiha>d in his status as 
prime minister, as head of the BN, and as chairperson of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference. Islamic modernism and Islamic 
neo-modernism thus became a political agenda in Malaysia under a 
different name. Yet, it is clear that Badawi advanced such ideas in 
order to counter PAS’s political activities in Malaysia, especially 
regarding Islamic interpretation in the political arena. In his address to 
the Jami Millia Islamia Badawi claimed that the opposition Pan-Malaysia 
Islamic Party had politicized religion to the extent that it had claimed a 
virtual monopoly on Islam. Badawi even accused them of canvassing 
for votes by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if 
they vote for PAS.88 
Badawi’s strategy of Islam Hadhari was divided into stages. First, he 
asked the people to acknowledge that PAS’s interpretation to Islam 
was misleading and attempted to promote and propagate Islam Hadhari 
to counter PAS’s agenda. A special project called the Islam Hadhari 
Foundation was charged with disseminating the concept of Islam 
Hadhari to the Malaysian people through seminars and other 
activities.89  
Numerous other departments support the Islam Hadhari 
campaign. One of the most prominent representative of Islamic voices 
in Malaysia is JAKIM, the Department of Islamic Development of 
                                                                                                      
for Islamic Studies,” Magdalen College, University of Oxford, 1 October 2004, 
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86 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “Moving Forward Toward Excellence,” p. 5. 
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Malaysia. JAKIM proposes that Islam Hadhari is Malaysia’s way to 
implement an Islamic State.90 The official dakwah organization of 
Malaysia, YADIM, also supports Islam Hadhari.91 For the academic 
community there is the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia 
(IKIM) which holds frequent seminars to promote Islam Hadhari 
among scholars in Malaysia.92 Badawi is thus able to exercise his power 
and authority through many channels. Islam Hadhari is therefore clearly 
an UMNO political agenda, but it is also colored by authority, 
missionary fervor, politics, as well as an academic panorama and 
aroma. 
Badawi argued that it was PAS that politicized Islam, not UMNO. 
He claimed that it was not in UMNO’s nature to trivialize religion. 
UMNO has never allowed religion to be used as a political tool, it 
staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate 
people’s beliefs, and it has always ensured that Islam and Muslims are 
protected from such abuse of religion.93 Yet, it is clear that Islam has 
frequently been used as part of a political agenda in Malaysia during 
the era of Mahathir Mohammad, who took every opportunity to argue 
that Islam could be reconciled with modernization and economic 
development.94 For its part PAS began its life in 1951 by championing 
democracy and a post-colonial state founded on the teaching of 
Islam.95 Under Anwar Ibrahim, ABIM (the Malaysian Islamic Youth 
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and the Political Process in Malaysia,” Asian Survey Vol. XXI, No. 1 (1981); 
Mohammad Abu Bakar, “External Influences of Contemporary Islamic Resurgence in 
Malaysia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 13, No. 1 (1991).  
95 For a study of PAS see Noor, Farish A., PAS post-Fadzil Noor: Future Directions and 
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25, No. 2 (2003): pp. 200-232; Kamarulnizam Abdullah, The Politics of Islam in 
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Movement), established in 1971, used Islam to articulate contemporary 
social issues such as poverty, uneven distribution of wealth, and 
government corruption.  
Badawi’s Islam Hadhari project turned out to be the winning ticket 
for UMNO in the general elections in 2004. Yang Razali Kassim 
argues that a significant outcome of the election that year was the re-
ordering of the political landscape that was already affected by the 
growing political and social influence of Islam.96 The use of Islam 
Hadhari by UMNO as a political tool during the election campaign had 
successfully countered PAS’s brand of Islam and its call for an Islamic 
state. In Badawi’s address at the 56th UMNO General Assembly in 
2005 he declared that he would develop Islam Hadhari further for the 
empowerment of Muslim society in Malaysia.97  
Islam Hadhari became a political formula for UMNO in the 2003-
2004 struggle against the opposition. It was formulated for the purpose 
of countering the issue of the Islamic state that was promoted by the 
PAS. However, most of the Islamic institutions promote Islam Hadhari 
as a new way of interpreting Islam. It seems that Islam Hadhari has 
become a tool to develop Malaysia in the image of true Islam.  
Islam Progresif: 
An Umbrella for the Islamic Reformation  
On the issue of the relation between Islam Progresif, Islam Liberal, 
and Islam Hadhari, two prominent Islamic scholars, Omid Safi and 
Farish Noor, have differing opinions. Farish Noor, a former fellow at 
the Centre for Modern Orient Studies, Berlin,98 argues that,  
… this debate about Islam Hadari, Islam Liberal, Islam 
Progresif is misleading. There is only one Islam and these are 
merely approaches at trying to understand Islam and its 
goals in the context of the present. So I would see these as 
various attempts at trying to locate and contextualise the 
praxis of Islam in the realities of today. But there has to be 
one starting point, namely the fundamentals of Islam itself. 
There can be no addition or questioning of ‘aqîdah and 
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imân. When that happens there is no progress or liberalism, 
only distortion and adaptation that is bid'ah. 
So when I use the term ‘Islam Progressive’, I mean any 
application of Islamic norms and praxis that progresses 
from the fundamentals of Islam. Never any kind of Islam 
that goes against the tenets of imân and ‘aqîdah. Eg: Islam is 
concerned with social justice, but how do we address the 
needs for social justice today? For me it means taking into 
account the effects of globalization, global capitalism, 
international finance etc. We cannot hide from these 
realities any more than we can hide from American cultural 
hegemony and military imperialism. So for me, Islam and 
Muslims have to confront these challenges, but from the 
starting point of Islamic fundamentals.99 
Omid Safi, assistant professor of Islamic Studies at Colgate 
University in Hamilton, New York, and co-chair for the Study of Islam 
Section at the American Academy of Religion,100 summarized his views 
as follows,  
I think you’ll see that there is a difference between what I 
am talking about and what Charles Kurzman was doing, 
especially in the area of the critique of colonialism, as well a 
more critical attitude towards the excesses of modernity in 
areas of nationalism and environmental destruction, and 
shortcomings in racism, etc.101  
“Progressive Islam” is concerned with contemporary challenges to 
Muslims based on i>ma>n and ‘aqi>dah. It has its origins with the conflict 
between Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua in Padang and also some parts of 
Malaya in the early nineteenth century.102 Farish Noor maintains that 
the roots of the progressive Islamist project are in the Malay 
Archipelago. It began when this generation of modernist-reformist 
                                                 
99 Email correspondence with Farish Noor, 23 October 2005. 
100 See Omid Safi, http://classes.colgate.edu/osafi/  
101 Email correspondence with Omid Safi, 26 October 2005.  
102 Murni Djamal, “The Origin of the Islamic Reform Movement in Minangkabau: Life 
and Thought of Abdul Karim Amrullah,” Studia Islamika 5, no. 3 (1998), pp. 1-45; 
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thinkers, activists, and `ulama>’ in the nineteenth century103 spread the 
ideas of the reformists from the Middle East, influenced by tahayyul, 
bid‘ah (heretical innovations), and khurafat, with the intention of 
purifying Muslim tradition practices.104 During the period of intense 
political, discursive and at times physical conflict between the Kaum 
Muda reformists and the Kaum Tua we find the terms pembaharuan 
(renewal), nahd}ah (rebirth, renaissance) and modernisme (modernity) 
being introduced into the discursive economy of normative Islam for 
the first time.105  
Progressive Islam develops, Islamic reformism based on such ideas 
as tajdi >d and is }la>h}. Tajd>d is usually translated as “renewal” and is }la>h} as 
“reform”, while ih}ya>’ means revival. Some scholars also use the Arabic 
word nahd}ah which translates as “rising,” “awakening,” “revival,” or 
“renaissance”. Historically, this term began to be used from the end of 
World War I. According to Jacques Waardenburg, the term “reform” 
(is }la>h}) has three different meanings.106 The first meaning connotes a 
return to the spiritual core of a religious tradition. In this context, the 
is }la>h} movement in Islam desired to return to the essential principles of 
the Qur’a>n as well as the early Sunnah (Prophetic traditions). The 
second meaning of “reform” is the adaptation of a religion to modern 
times and its demands which are different from those of earlier times. 
The third meaning of “reform” suggests the conscious introduction of 
self-critical reasoning in the religious domain, such as that expressed by 
the term “Reform Judaism”.  
These terms relate to the work and writings of Muh}ammad ‘Abduh 
and Rashi>d Rid}a>. In Southeast Asia, their ideas were spread by Shaykh 
T{a>hir Jala>l al-Di>n al-Azhari >, a former student of Ah}mad Khat}i>b and 
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Syed Shaykh al-Ha>di> in Minangkabau.107 Farish Noor regards these 
figures as the founding fathers of Progressive Islam and the Islamic 
modernist movement Kaum Muda in Southeast Asia.108 In Indonesia 
these ideas were also promoted by Agus Salim through his 
organization Jong Islamieten Bond in 1925 and H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto 
through Sarekat Islam.109 Agus Salim was also a student of Shaykh 
Ah }mad Khat }i>b. Riddell notes that “Haji Agus Salim, like Muh}ammad 
T{a>hir bin Jala>l al-Di>n al-Azhari >, was related to Ah}mad Khat }i>b, and 
studied while posted to the Dutch Consulate in Jeddah during the 
period 1904-13”.110 Shaykh Ah }mad Khat}i>b, however, was the 
originator of the Islamic reform movement in the Minangkabau area, 
and propagated his ideas in Makkah throughout the last two decades of 
the nineteenth century and the early years of the present century.111 It 
is clear, therefore, that the idea of Progressive Islam originated with 
Shaykh Ah }mad Khat}i>b and his students, Shaykh T{a>hir bin Jala>l al-Di>n 
al-Azhari >and  Agus Salim.  
Over the last decade, the concept of Progressive Islam has not 
been discussed in a formal way like Islam Liberal and Islam Hadhari. For 
Omid Safi,  
The various understandings of Islam which fall under the 
rubric of ‘progressive’ are both continuations of, and 
radical departures from, the one-hundred-fifty-year old 
tradition of liberal Islam. Liberal advocates of Islam 
generally display an uncritical, almost devotional 
identification with modernity, and often (but do not 
always) by-pass discussions of colonialism and imperialism. 
Progressive advocates of Islam […] are almost uniformly 
critical of colonialism, both of its nineteenth century 
manifestation and its current variety. Progressive Muslims 
                                                 
107 Djamal, “The Origin of the Islamic Reform Movement in Minangkabau: Life and 
Thought of Abdul Karim Amrullah,” p. 9; Murni Djamal, Dr. H. Abdul Karim 
Amrullah: Pengaruhnya Dalam Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam Di Minangkabau Pada Awal 
Abad Ke-20 (Jakarta: INIS, 2002); Farish A. Noor, From Majapahit to Putrajaya: Searching 
for Another Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Silverfishbooks, 2005), p. 165.  
108 Noor, From Majapahit to Putrajaya: Searching for Another Malaysia, p. 165.  
109 Ibid., pp. 163-5.  
110 Riddel, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses, p. 214.  
111 Djamal, “The Origin of the Islamic Reform Movement in Minangkabau: Life and 
Thought of Abdul Karim Amrullah.”  
  
Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 05, Number 01, June 2011 
120 
espouse a critical and non-apologetic ‘multiple critique’ 
with respect to both Islam and modernity. They are 
undoubtedly postmodern in the sense of their critical 
approach to modernity. That double engagement with the 
varieties of Islam and modernity, plus an emphasis on 
concrete social action and transformation, is the defining 
characteristic of progressive Islam today.112  
The concept of progressive Islam has not been formally 
institutionalized like Islam Hadhari and Islam Liberal. In Southeast Asia, 
every Islamic movement that introduces progressive ideas such as 
human rights, justice, gender, and equality can be regarded as 
“progressive”. Omid Safi points to the works of Muzaffar and Farish 
Noor as being progressive in this sense. Muzaffar, is a leading scholar 
in Malaysia with his Just World Trust (JUST).113 He has been very 
critical of the policies of the Malaysian government, as well as of the 
West and also Islamic revivalist groups”.114 Muzaffar has also been 
heavily involved in religious dialogue in Malaysia. For Muzaffar, 
common values among religions, 
Can be divided into five categories. One, attitudes and 
orientations which help to make the individual a morally 
better person and, at the time, elevate the ethical content 
and quality of society. Two, attitudes and orientations 
which have a negative impact upon the individual and 
society, and therefore, contribute towards our 
understanding and appreciation of the positive moral 
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values that we must uphold. Three, values associated with 
institutions or the human being’s larger environment which 
serve to enhance the moral ballast of human existence. 
Four, worldviews and visions associated with the meaning 
of life and life processes which suggest that the different 
religions may, in some respects share similar outlooks on 
what they consider important in life. Five, realities 
pertaining to the human being and the human condition 
which, on reflection, seem to suggest that there are 
common virtues and vices in actual human behaviour that 
transcend religious dichotomies.115  
Muzaffar proposes that there are certain universal values brought 
by religion into the world. These include concepts of good and bad, 
right and wrong, and issues of ethics and morality. The subject of 
religious ethics has also been much discussed by Indonesian scholars 
such as Madjid, Wahid, and Abdullah. Islam Liberal activists in 
Indonesia have also put forward the issue of religious dialogue 
between Islam and other religions in Indonesia. In Malaysia, Muzaffar 
suggests that not enough emphasis has been given to developing 
shared principles and ethics in public life.116 Even though Malaysia is a 
multi-ethnic state, Malaysia’s races live peacefully, but separately – they 
have separate schools, separate friends, and separate social lives.117 
However according to Muzaffar, it is partly because multi-ethnic 
Malaysia continues to hold together that the ruling elite and the 
influential social stratum in general do not need to introduce a novel 
idea into the nation-building process – that of emphasizing common 
values shared by the different religious communities in the country.118 
It seems that progressive Islam is similar to other streams of Islamic 
thought in Southeast Asia, especially the modernists and neo-
modernists, although it tends to be more anti-American and is 
opposed to American hegemony in the region. 
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Conclusion 
As an intellectual movement, Islam Liberal differs from Islam 
Hadhari in that it does not originate from government sources. Islam 
Progresif, on the other hand, is more of an umbrella term referring to 
various strands of thought developed by Muslims opposed to the 
status quo. Although Islam Hadhari is a newly-coined term, it in fact 
contains many elements in common with other schools of Islamic 
thought including Islam Liberal and neo-modernist Islam. The rise of 
Islam Liberal is a response to the increased prominence of hard-line 
Islamic movements in Indonesia. It is more of a “bottom up” 
movement supported by many intellectuals, not only in Indonesia but 
also in America and the Middle East. In this context, Islam Progresif can 
be seen as the inheritor of the historical tradition of Islamic reformism 
in Southeast Asia. In recent years, however, Islam Progresif has tended to 
be used by some scholars to criticize both Southeast Asian 
governments and the West, especially America.  
In fact, the labeling of Islamic thought is quite confusing for many 
Southeast Asian Muslims. In Malaysia, many Malays still reject the 
concept of Islam Hadhari because of its name, while in Indonesia many 
see the Liberal Islam Network as an orientalist organization which 
promotes the thinking of infidels. In comparing the different schools 
of thought and the periods in which they have been developed, 
perhaps Khaled Abou El-Fadl makes the most apt observation: “All 
Islamic groups and organization claim to adhere to the fundamentals 
of Islam; Even the most liberal movement will insist that its ideas and 
convictions better represent the fundamentals of the faith.”119 [] 
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